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Introduction
The following commentary aims to analyze the main characteristics of intervention
described in MARO: Mass Atrocity Response Operations; A Military Planning Handbook and to also provide a legal and historical context in which to address that work.
In other words, we believe that in order for the inner value of MARO to be assessed,
the handbook should be contextualized with the history of American intervention
and several aspects of international law.
First, it is important to provide the context in which this article was produced.
On the one hand, we promote interdisciplinary work, especially work on law and
history, since it enriches perspectives, contributions, and opinions. On the other
hand, because we are from Argentina we might offer a different perspective on intervention operations in general and on MAROs in particular. That is to say, living
in and being part of a developing region give us the opportunity to offer different
opinions on intervention practices. It is also necessary to make it clear that because
our professional training is not of a military nature we are not able to provide an indepth analysis of the action plan described in MARO, particularly regarding the
operative aspects that were formulated by military strategy experts. These limitations,
however, do not push us away from our objective; rather, they bring us closer to it.
This commentary does not intend to provide instructions on how to conduct a military
operation in cases of massive crimes; rather, it intends to investigate whether a
MARO constitutes an ethical and moral option and whether it is the best practical
way to avoid, prevent, and control crimes against humanity (such as genocides,
massacres, and war crimes). Although MARO intends to describe the military actions
to be taken in cases of massive crimes, there is a lack of introspective and selfreflexive analysis of American interventions in the handbook along with a unilateral
view, created by US military forces, of the operating methods in these situations.
Both of these aspects compel us to combine a historical perspective with a legal one
in our consideration of MARO.
Taking into account the observations made above, we divided this commentary
into three sections and a final conclusion. In the following section we provide a short
analysis of different American military interventions, focusing on the way they
unfold in the intervention regions. The second section deals with intervention and
considers the legal contributions and change in paradigm after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union. The last section concentrates on the concept of a MARO, providing
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a critical analysis of the contents of the book in question, especially of the role of
international organizations and local agencies. Apart from reconsidering action plans
and interventions in cases of mass crimes against civil society for future discussions,
we discuss the controversy that surrounds this issue.

A Short History of American Interventions
The United States is the country that has intervened most often in the affairs of
other states in the world. Those interventions were responses, in general terms, to
interests related to external policies and/or economic interests over the affected
nation.
The purpose of this section is to place MARO into a historical context. By doing
so, we may find that MARO has hidden intentions under its pragmatic proposal
to provide instructions on ‘‘how’’ to militarily intervene in cases of massive crimes
against a civil society.
We can go back in history to the year 1916 as the starting point of this issue.
Beginning in this year, American military forces occupied the Dominican Republic
for eight years because it got into arrears with a loan. The formal declaration stated:
Dominican Republic is in a state of military occupations . . . and remains submitted to
the military government and to the exercise of the military Law applicable to such
occupation. This military occupation has not the purpose of destroying Dominican
Republic sovereignty, but on the contrary, is intended to help the country to recover
the internal order condition, what will be helpful to fulfill provisions stated on the
named Convention, and also to comply with all obligations that may correspond as
member of Nations Family. . . . I ask all Dominican citizens . . . to cooperate with US
Forces in occupation.1

After the Second World War, the United States intervened directly in more than
eighty countries (this figure includes cases of joint and unilateral interventions).
Most of these interventions were linked to the Cold War against USSR Communism.
As examples we can mention interventions like the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949),
interventions in Italy (1947–1948), Greece (1947–1949; 1964–1974), Philippines,
Korea, Iran (together with England in 1953), Guatemala (1953–1990), Vietnam
(1950–1973), Cambodia (1955–1973), Congo/Zaire (1960–1965), Indonesia (1965),
Nicaragua (1978–1979), Granada (1979–1984), El Salvador (1980–1992), Haiti
(1987–1994). Notably, we are not taking into consideration indirect interventions
that, just to give an example, provided support (i.e., military intelligence) to several
leaders that governed in Latin America during different military dictatorships.
Looking back to the history of interventions, especially in the areas of Latin
America, Africa, and the Middle East, should call the attention of MARO’s authors
to the nature of intervention and its historical effects. It can be stated that the
current situation is different from that in the time of the Cold War, but the traumatic
effects of interventions do not disappear with time and can be used against American
forces. In other words, as professionals trained in Argentina, we wonder why it
is that the MARO project would have better results in preventing, controlling, and
stabilizing countries where massive crimes against civil society are committed
and if such would indeed be the case. The answer is open to the (dis)trust that the
United States inspires in peripheral countries. MARO does not take into account
historical characteristics of each country, and even if the project centers its efforts
on the analysis of the nation in which the intervention is to occur and even if
assistance to the transition government is part of its stabilizing practice (55–58),
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it nevertheless subsumes the role that the intervened nation adopts into its own
operating power.

Legal Aspects of Intervention
The Difference between ‘‘Humanitarian Intervention’’ and
‘‘Humanitarian Action’’
Within the framework of Public International Law there exists a substantial distinction between the concept of ‘‘humanitarian intervention’’ and that of ‘‘humanitarian
action.’’ Even if we can distinguish between two fundamental approaches within this
topic, such as International Law of Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law, both seem to come together when dealing with issues related to intervention.
What is important to underline is that ‘‘intervention’’ is in general a broader concept
than the concept of humanitarian military intervention since the latter refers strictly
to direct and exclusive armed action. Meanwhile, when we talk about humanitarian
action in a strictly judicial sense, we refer to the actions considered by International
Humanitarian Law as assistance law that can guide organizations like the International Red Cross. On the other hand, a clear example of humanitarian military
intervention is the case of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.
Humanitarian military intervention and humanitarian action are similar in that
they are both used as ultima ratio, that is to say, when there are no other ways of
solving the consequences of a conflict.
It is important to highlight the internal contradiction between the use of forces
and the humanitarian motive. The exercise of military force can never constitute a
humanitarian act, even when it uses humanitarian discourse to justify its repressive
action.
Thus, from a juridical point of view as well as that of the conceptual principles of
Public International Law, a humanitarian intervention may constitute an exception
to the three most consolidated principles of international law: (1) state sovereignty;
(2) the principle that one state should not intervene in the internal issues of other
states; and (3) the prohibition of the use of armed forces.2
These three principles constitute the basic pillar of international relations and
they are stated in the United Nations Charter. The Charter does not refer explicitly
to humanitarian intervention, but in regards to the use of force the Charter provides
the Security Council with the option to adopt two types of measures, which are
outlined in Chapter VII, particularly in Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter.3 Article
41 specifies the measures that can be applied without armed forces (such as the
complete or partial interruption of communications, economic activities, or diplomatic
relationships), and Article 42 describes the measures that can be used involving
the participation of armed forces and states (such as demonstrations, blockades, and
military operations such as those in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and so forth).
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the development of a globalized
world, the idea of humanitarian military intervention, including in some cases unilateral military intervention, was put into practice in several cases such as Somalia
(1992–1995), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995), Rwanda (1994), Sierra Leone
(1997–1999), Kosovo (1996–1999), Liberia (1999–2003), and the Congo (1998–
present).
Taking into consideration the elements stated above raises questions about the
effect of intervention on state sovereignty.
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The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the MARO Project versus
State Sovereignty
The increasing importance of humanitarian military intervention and the potential
risk of this principle becoming an international practice that may threaten state
sovereignty are publicly debated.
The type of interventions mentioned above occurred within the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the deepening neoliberal policies of the capitalist system and its
political consequences, especially these consequences as they relate to the principle
of state sovereignty at all levels.
Discussions about intervention in cases of humanitarian crises may find their
starting point in the famous phrase of a former United Nations General Secretary,
Koffi Annan: ‘‘. . . if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault
on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and
systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common
humanity?’’ 4
After the debate generated by this issue, Canada was the head office of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) where two main
basic principles were defined in order to justify the doctrine of Responsibility to Project
(R2P)5: first, state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility
for the protection of its people lies with the state itself, and second, when a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression, or
state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the
principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.
Even though the MARO project states that it does not defend military intervention and that its action field is confined to cases of extreme need, like cases of
genocides and mass killings, the R2P doctrine is the basis of its ideological support.
The document outlined by ICISS represents a ‘‘before and after’’ in the conception of state sovereignty and military intervention as it tries to create a new
vocabulary by which to define antique practices and justify the change of paradigm
towards a global world which would include a project such as MARO as an operative
tool but restricted to extreme cases.
R2P and the MARO project are perfect expressions of global strategies of
unilateral action for military intervention. Proof of this became evident, for the
first time, when NATO bombed Serbia’s position in Kosovo after approving the New
Strategic Concept in April 1999.
The New Strategic Concept redefined NATO’s future objectives, methodology,
and scope of action. The main way in which NATO was transformed was in its
move from defensive objectives to the assumption of the essential mission of defending security and democratic values within and outside its boundaries, a mission that
includes a struggle against genocide, terrorism, and the elimination of weapons of
mass destruction. Further, tensions existing between the development of R2P and
principles of state sovereignty can be understood under the New Strategic Concept
which allowed NATO to retain its right to act without the formal authorization of
the United Nations Security Council provided that its actions respect the Organic
Charter or the Council Resolutions. In this way, NATO obtained its own unilateral
humanitarian intervention right disregarding all emerging principles of the United
Nations Charter which stipulated that regional organizations should not apply any
coercive measure without the consent of the Security Council.
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All of the changes mentioned occurred after the end of the Cold War as the
United States emerged as a dominant world power. As an example, we can recall
that it acted above the United Nations in the case of the ‘‘preventative attack’’
of Iraq.
As a conclusion, we can observe that the role played by the United Nations
became of secondary importance in the world despite the end of the Cold War and
the dissolution of the absolute principle of state sovereignty.
In relation to this last point, the concept of national sovereignty raises another
issue. Although various states guarantee that they will observe the principles of
international law and human rights protection, most states are increasingly inclined
toward the consolidation of a globalized system in which transnational economic
power operates by means of supranational organizations like the World Trade
Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. The classic concept of
nation-state as it was understood at the moment when the United Nations Charter
was approved in 1946 is no longer valid.
The authority of the United Nations is fundamental in order to avoid the consolidation of a power axis capable of intervening unilaterally in sovereign states
either under the doctrine of R2P or within a MARO framework. However, the United
Nations Security Council is under the domain of the same powers that retain unilateral intervention capability, a paradox that presents a situation with little space
of action. It is time to rebuild and strengthen the United Nations in order to allow
for a plurality of voices and especially to allow the voices of those weak states that
face the potential risk of genocide and massive violations of human rights to be
heard.
Acting outside of the framework of international law can contribute to the discredit of legal entities; eventually, subjects of international law may be deprived of
judicial protection and, instead, the unilateral decisions of powerful states can come
to dominate the international arena.

Shoot MARO Heart: The Utility of Unilateral Intervention Practice6
MARO is presented as a potential military doctrine for the use of American armed
forces in cases of massive human rights violations. What the handbook’s authors
consider its key virtue is actually a fallacy: MARO does not question whether an
intervention should take place, but only ‘‘how’’ to intervene.7 Certainly, in situations
of extreme violence over a civil society in which the rate of massive killings multiplies at a rapid pace, and especially in cases when states’ governments are involved
as perpetrators of violence, wondering whether to intervene or not to intervene
can be a useless question, as cases such as those of Rwanda, Darfur, and Kosovo
evidenced. However, it is also dangerous to assume that it is necessary to intervene
unilaterally in regions that historically and culturally differ from the American
egocentric thinking and/or consider American military action as an imperialistic
advance over the self-determination of nations. Like many other American humanitarian organizations, they ask for military intervention in regions in which massive
crimes occur (13). Other humanitarian NGOs, however, disagree with the American
army assuming for itself the role of democracy’s spokesperson.
The fundamental questions in order to determine if a MARO is legally accepted
by nations and societies are, first, questions about who should intervene. Once this is
established, we can then wonder how to intervene. The unilateral intervention of the
United States and its allies, such as NATO, cannot be considered as a humanitarian
practice but as a hegemonic expansion over states with less democratic stability.
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Again, we can go over the analysis of the discord between MARO discourse and
the real interest of American interventions in the world. Following this question, a
MARO organization chart (58) proposes that the United States becomes the potential
figure of a Military Allied Committee. The real hierarchical relationship between
international and local allies is confined to coordination spaces.
It is perhaps unnecessary to specify that we are skeptical of the MARO project.
However, in regards to intervention, both the role of the United States and that of
the nations involved directly or indirectly in crimes against humanity or genocide
need to be considered.
We believe that it is necessary to stay away from hypocritical speeches that talk
about nations’ need of Democracy and Freedom to operate with legitimacy in order to
guarantee the protection of inhabitants within their borders and to provide diversity
of thinking and actions outside of their boundaries by means of the United Nations.
We think it is necessary to direct attention to new intervention locations. In
other words, intervention is not only necessary in areas that are destroyed by
genocides and in suffering countries; rather, intervention is also necessary where
the material tools used to perform mass killings and genocides (weapons, soldiers)
are being manufactured, even if intervening involves dealing with a world-wide,
multi-million-dollar business. In conclusion, it is time to start considering how
many and what types of intervention are necessary. It is time to understand that
massacres in a distant place may have responsible actors in the industries of the
central countries.
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